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Marc Djaballah, Kant, Foucault, and Forms of Experience (London: Routledge, 
2008), ISBN: 978-0415956246 
 
Under the easy dictum of making Kant the “enemy” in twentieth-century French 
philosophy, it may still come as a surprise to find in Foucault’s work deep structural 
similarities to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant.1  In his newly published book, 
Marc Djaballah aims at revealing the extent to which these two thinkers interlock at 
a formal level.  By developing further the Foucaultian concept of a distinct attitude of 
thought present in Kant, Djaballah subverts the often invoked and expedient way of 
understanding Kant that splits his philosophy into the salvageable idea of criticism 
and the outdated and hence disposable doctrine of science and system from which the 
latter arises; it is this conceptual move that opens up for Djaballah a single analytical 
space to expose in Foucault's work a nuanced underlying indebtedness to and 
parallelism with Kant’s thought. Indeed, according to Djaballah’s main argument, 
the same Kantian practice of criticism is operative not only in Foucault’s reading of 
Kant, but also and most importantly for his thesis, in the very form of Foucault’s 
analysis of history. 
 
Setting aside current problems in Kantian scholarship as well as historical and 
philological issues, Djaballah identifies the “guiding thread of Kant’s enigmatic 
response to the problem of criticism”: that order and regularity in experience can be 
accounted for “in terms of a priori formal conditions that determine what can be 
cognized.” (30-31) This thread weaves together the five elements that Djaballah 
argues are both the faces and the regulative contours of what it means to speak of an 
attitude or “practice of criticism in the theoretical domain.” (30-31) He categorizes 
these as follows:  i) the capacity to abstract; ii) the need for the exercise of skepticism; 
iii) a functional understanding of the capacities of thought; iv) the submersion of 
                                                 
1   See Translators’ Introduction to Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties ,  
Deleuze’s early book on Kant, for a reference to Deleuze's characterization of the book: “I 
wrote it as a book on an enemy.” Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1985).  
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experience in thought; and v) the distinction between real and logical possibility as a 
background to the definition of the aim of philosophy.  
 
The first chapter of the book contains a detailed account of these five constitutive 
and regulative elements of a practice of criticism that Djaballah finds decisive for 
Kant’s thought.  He successfully avoids detours into minute interpretative polemics 
while at the same time showing an exceptional depth and breadth of scholarship as 
he construes his argument for a distinctly Kantian critical attitude of thought by 
reference to a diverse array of sources beyond the major Critiques and the prize essay 
“Was ist Aufklärung?” His references include pre-critical work, correspondences, 
lectures and other essays such as Kant’s famous response to Eberhard and his never 
finished “Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte...” The most important secondary 
referent is Deleuze’s La philosophie critique de Kant, specifically in relation to the 
latter’s analysis of Kant’s theory of the capacities of thought. 
 
Having established his interpretation of Kant in Chapter 1, Djaballah dedicates the 
rest of his study to showing the extent to which these five elements are identifiable 
in Foucault’s historical analysis. In one of the statements that elaborate on this 
transition, he writes: 
 
In his analysis of discursive practices, Foucault revives this movement of 
reasoning, and integrates it into a historical frame of reference, not in relation to 
objective experience as such, but in relation to historically and culturally local 
practices and the forms of experience they deploy.  The following exposition of 
Foucault’s conceptual practice shows how this transposition of Kantian criticism 
allows his studies to determine forms of experience in history, and their 
respective possible objects, the field of statements that appear as candidates of 
truth-or-falsity. (91) 
 
The first such transposition is discussed in Chapter 2, entitled “Nietzsche and the 
Critical Need to Wake Up.”  In this chapter, Djaballah argues that Foucault’s practice 
of criticism shares with Kant’s a “need for skeptical arousal.” (92) Foucault’s version, 
however, is presented as containing a significant Nietzschean component.  To make 
his case, the author dedicates a substantial part of the chapter to a reading of 
Nietzsche’s own texts.  Two of the central ideas discussed in this section are 
Nietzsche’s understanding of any philosophical production as always already 
containing a personal aspect of the person who generates it and of knowledge as an 
invention, an essentially violent ordering of the world and a source of security that 
acquires value through a process of habituation.  With this conceptual orientation, 
Djaballah then continues with the main thrust of the chapter.    
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A salient conceptual thread in Chapter 2 is Djaballah’s argument that there is a 
formal similarity between Kant’s antinomical moment in criticism —which he shows 
coincides in its theoretical significance with Kant’s awakening from the dogmatic 
slumber by his confrontation with Hume’s skepticism—and what Foucault takes to 
be the aim of thought and the goal of the various textual devises used in his historical 
work. (149)  The aim entails a new understanding of the practice of philosophy as 
experimentation and the goal is the inauguration of a “thinking otherwise” by way 
of experiments embodied in his archaeological or genealogical work and the use of 
literature, as in his reference to Borges’ Chinese Encyclopedia in Les mots et les choses.  
These experiments are the source of shock and self-estrangement in relation to what 
otherwise appear as naturalized regimes in epistemology, relations of power, and 
understanding of the self operative within the present historical moment.  
 
In Chapter 3, Djaballah pursues further the topic of the aim of Foucault's practice of 
criticism. He argues that the most important motivational and constitutive principle 
of Foucault’s practice entails a movement from a kind of criticism defined in terms 
of the finitude of human reason (Kant) to one in terms of the historical contingency of 
rationality. (195)  In his account, Djaballah discusses, first, Foucault’s interpretation of 
the epistemological role of Kant in Le mots et les choses and his conceptualization of a 
model of philosophical thinking in “Qu'est-ce que les Lumières?” in order to show 
points of convergence between the two authors.  And second, he discusses in what 
ways both thinkers are concerned with limits.  He argues that despite Foucault’s 
introduction of historical contingency, they share the same understanding of the 
function of rationality within forms of experience.  But most interestingly, he 
identifies two distinctly Foucaultian elements in the practice of criticism also relating 
to limits.  First, there is a “deliberate theoretical restraint” in methodology by giving 
“no principled priority in the relation between the historical and the theoretical,” 
thus creating what he calls a “theoretical instability” in his critical attitude. And, 
second, there is a constant endeavor through “experimentation” to go beyond the 
limits of thought, that is, to “think otherwise.” (201) 
 
Having already brought into the fold the concept of “form of experience,” Djaballah 
makes this the locus of Chapter 4.  His argument for this transposition revolves 
around his analysis of the Foucaultian concepts of practice, discourse, and the 
historical a priori as corresponding to the Kantian concepts of form of experience, 
spontaneity, and receptivity.  By limiting the correspondence to the function that 
these concepts play within their respective works, he accommodates the diachronic 
element in Foucault’s theory as well as the fact that his analysis is retroactive (of past 
forms of experiences, but not of the form of experience in general). (222)  This 
chapter is the most Foucaultian in that the original and distinct characteristics of his 
work are brought to the fore. 
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It is possible to point out that some of the five facets and regulative segments 
introduced by Djaballah as woven through Kant’s solution to his critical problem are 
not unique to Kant, and thus that the very underlying raison d’être of Djaballah’s 
project is undermined.  This is a criticism raised by Oksala in her review of the text, 
in particular with respect to the skeptical moment that Djaballah argues is shared by 
Kant and Foucault; she rightly points out that variations of it are also found, for 
instance, in the works of Descartes, Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty.2 Thus, one 
asks:  Why Kant?  Despite this observation, however, it is important to keep in mind 
that Djaballah is not arguing that any one of these cannot be found elsewhere, but 
that all five are essential characteristics of Kant’s critical way of theorizing and that 
precisely these five are also found working together, renewed by the demands of a 
new historical epoch, within Foucault’s theoretical orientation.  Moreover, if one 
takes into account the specter of Kant throughout all stages of Foucault’s work, 
something that Djaballah establishes convincingly and is becoming ever more 
apparent thanks to new publications on the subject, then it becomes harder to claim 
that these parallels in the form of practicing criticism is mere coincidence. 
 
What is at stake for any reader of Djaballah’s study is to determine, first, if he 
accurately identifies the relevant elements in Kant’s critical attitude.  In other words, 
are what he extracts from Kant’s work as formal elements of his thinking Kantian 
enough?  And, following this, to consider whether he sufficiently transposes these 
elements, while retaining the specificity of Foucault’s diachronic and practice-
centered approach, to accept the claim that they share in the same form of criticism.  
The arguments are too complex and nuanced to carry out such an evaluation here.  
However, with a wealth of textual evidence and incisive interpretations of the work 
of all of the figures, the author makes a very compelling case for both of these.  
 
The text is not always easy reading because of a writing style characterized at times 
by unnecessary complex sentence structures, repetitions and analytic detours that, 
albeit extremely interesting, obscure the main points at hand—likely the result of 
working with the disparate styles of those about whom he is writing.  Aside from 
this minor note, Djaballah’s Kant, Foucault and the Forms of Experience is undoubtedly 
a major contribution to Foucault studies as a whole.  The author’s approach is also 
an invitation to reevaluate the role Kant’s work played in twentieth-century French 
philosophy and an opportunity for the reader to reconsider the resources available 
within it.  Finally, for those of us who have been involved for some time now in 
research that focuses on Foucault’s Kantianism, it is an exciting work that does a 
                                                 
2   Johanna Oksala, “Kant, Foucault, and the Forms of Experience,” Notre Dame Philosophical  
Review, (January 28,, 2009), http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15127   
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wonderful job of extending our interpretative road maps.  It sets a standard that will 
be hard to match.   
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